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Property rights finally seem to be getting some respect. From the
renaissance of the Takings Clause1 to state legislation requiring that
t A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University.
This Article is based on work first begun under a grant from the Max Planck Society in
Germany. I am deeply grateful to the Society for its generous support and to the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, in Heidelberg, where I
was a Visiting Fellow in spring 1996. The personnel at the Institute, particularly its co-
Director, Professor Dr. Jochen Frowein, were extremely kind and helpful to my work there,
and I wish to express my gratitude to them. I am also grateful to Professor Dr. Franz Merli
of the University of Heidelberg law faculty for his invaluable insights into German takings
law. Hanno Kube also provided help in initially finding my way through the labyrinth of
German constitutional property law. Thanks also to Alexander Lemke, Max Kirchner, and
Jonathan Manders for help with some translations.
I See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a city could not
condition the approval of a building permit on the dedication of a portion of an appli-
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compensation be paid for a broad range of regulatory restrictions,2
the property rights movement has scored impressive gains within the
past several years. 3 If its war against bird lovers, tree huggers, and
other like-minded "collectivists" is not yet entirely won, at least the
pendulum seems to have swung in favor of the movement.4
These successes of the property rights movement once again raise
the question of the degree of substantive protection that should be
accorded to property rights, not only under the Takings Clause of the
Federal Constitution but also for substantive due process purposes
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Why has property not been
treated as a fundamental right, equal in status to the Due Process
Clause's liberty interest or rights under the Equal Protection Clause,
including the rights to vote and procreate?5 There is no dearth of
contemporary commentators who believe that it should be. Scholars
like Richard Epstein 6 and James Ely7 have argued that, properly un-
derstood, the Constitution provides no basis for relegating property to
an inferior position in a lexical ordering of constitutional rights.
"Under the proper analysis," Epstein contends, "all rights are, as it
cant's property for flood control and traffic improvements); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (creating new category of per se taking for regulations that entirely
destroy all economic value of affected land).
2 Several states have enacted legislation requiring that government agencies deter-
mine whether their actions may constitute a taking of property. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-1-201 to -206 (1999); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-2007.045 (Vernon 2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -90a4 (1997 & Supp. 2002). Florida's statute authorizes
compensation when an owner proves that a governmental action "has inordinately bur-
dened" the use of land. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West Supp. 2002). For critical discus-
sions of such legislation, see John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face
of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property
Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (1995);Jerome M. Organ, Understanding State
and Federal Property Rights Legislation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 191 (1995).
- For background on the current property rights movement, see A WOLF IN THE GAR-
DEN: THE LAND RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THLE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE (Philip D. Brick
& R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996) and LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBEL-
LION (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
4 On the recent property rights movement in general, see LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE:
WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (John D. Echeverria & Raymond
Booth Eby eds., 1995) and JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATrERS (1997).
5 Shortly after this Article was completed, a student Comment with a similar title to
this Article's appeared. Tonya R. Draeger, Comment, Property as a Fundamental Right in the
United States and Germany: A Comparison of Takings Jurisprudence, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 363
(2001). Despite this surface similarity, there is little overlap between the two articles. In
particular, the student Comment does not address the central question of this Article: Why
is property accorded a higher status under the German constitution than it is under the
U.S. Constitution, especially given the greater emphasis that private property as a social
institution plays in this country compared with Germany, a social-welfare state?
6 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985).
7 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIs-
TORY Oi: PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998).
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were, fundamental."" Similarly, one may understand recent Supreme
Court decisions like Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,9 Dolan v.
City of Tigard,10 and, more recently, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel II as at-
tempts by the Court to pave the way for a gradual shift of property
rights into the ranks of established fundamental rights like the free-
doms of speech, association, and procreation. 12 Indeed, in Dolan,
Chief Justice Rehnquist unambiguously stated, "We see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill
of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be
relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable
circumstances."] 3
Although property rights have gained greater protection under
the Takings Clause, they nevertheless remain a "poor relation" to lib-
erty interests for substantive due process purposes. 14 Courts treat lib-
erty interests as "fundamental," vigorously protecting them against all
governmental encroachments save those undertaken for "compelling"
reasons.' 5 Property interests, on the other hand, cannot resist any
governmental encroachment that passes a weak "rationality" standard.
No modern Supreme Court decision has recognized a property right
as fundamental for substantive due process purposes.' 6
8 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 143.
9 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
11 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
12 For an attack on the sophistry underlying these calls for equal treatment of prop-
erty with other personal constitutional rights, see Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish
Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (1996). An earlier, and bril-
liant, critique of this argument is C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986).
13 512 U.S. at 392.
14 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 CEO. L.J. 555, 560
(1997) ("[P]laintiffs who wish to assert that the deprivation of a particular property interest
violates substantive due process have had difficulty getting the contemporary Supreme
Court's attention.").
15 See, e.g., Washington v. Clucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe... "fundamental" liberty interests at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."' (alteration in original) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
302 (1993))).
16 In the lower federal courts, a split has emerged over whether substantive due pro-
cess protects property interests at all. Compare Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that substantive due process pro-
tects property rights), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled byArmendariz v. Penman,
75 F.3d 1311, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), and Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
29, 794 F.2d 322, 328-30 (8th Cir. 1986) (same), with Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv.
Employees v. Town Bd. of Huntington, 31 F.3d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
substantive due process does not protect property interests in premium payments to a
trust), and Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1352-56 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that sub-
stantive due process does not protect property interest in contractual right to promotion).
For a discussion of this split in the federal circuits, see Robert Ashbrook, Comment, Land
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As every constitutionalist knows, things were different once.
Property once enjoyed an exalted status in American constitutional
law. During the notorious Lochner era, the Supreme Court used the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect not only
liberty of contract but property interests as well.' 7 Indeed, the Court
barely distinguished then between property and contract for due pro-
cess purposes, tending to lump together all private economic interests
in its aggressive attack against the activist state. The story of Lochner's
rise and demise is too familiar even to summarize here.' 8 Suffice it to
say that after Lochner's downfall in 1937, property was pushed to the
constitutional back burner, much to the oft-repeated dismay of politi-
cal conservatives. They declaim and lament the "double standard"
that has existed between the judicial treatment of property rights and
political rights ever since the infamous footnote 4 in Carolene
Products. 19
It is understandable why conservatives are perplexed over the ap-
parently inferior position of property rights in modern American con-
stitutional law. That the world's leading market-oriented nation
relegates property to the ranks of subordinate constitutional rights
creates at least an apparent paradox. The paradox grows when the
status of property under the American Constitution is compared with
property's place in the constitutional hierarchy of Western nations
with strong roots in the tradition of social welfarism.
A pertinent example is the Federal Republic of Germany. Unlike
the American Constitution, whose Due Process and Takings Clauses
do not recognize property rights in affirmative terms and do not ex-
plicitly recognize private property as a legitimate institution, the Ger-
man Constitution (actually termed the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz) both
explicitly affirms private property's institutional legitimacy and grants
it constitutional protection in positive terms. Thus, rather than stat-
ing that property shall not be taken or owners shall not be govern-
mentally deprived of their property except under certain
Development, The Graham Doctrine, and the Extinction of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150
U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1265-76 (2002).
A recent article argues that courts should recognize the existence of some fundamen-
tal property interests, protectible as strictly as fundamental liberty interests, and should
also grant somewhat more modest protection to nonfundamental property interests. See
Krotoszynski, supra note 14, at 559. Krotoszynski's suggested approach, particularly in its
emphasis on the type of property interest involved, somewhat resembles the approach
taken by the German Constitutional Court for purposes of determining when and whether
a governmental act must be struck down as violating the property clause of the German
Basic Law. See discussion infra Parts II and IlI.
17 See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
18 For a recent telling, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
19 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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circumstances, Article 14 states: "Property and inheritance are guaran-
teed."20 The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
has interpreted this provision as guaranteeing the existence of private
property as a legal institution.21 Further, the Court has expressly char-
acterized the right to private ownership of property as "an elementary
basic right."22
Astute American scholars of German constitutional law have
pointed out the important position that property occupies in the list
of German individual rights. David Currie, for example, has observed
that "property rights are by no means relegated to an inferior position
in Germany, as they have been in the United States." 23 So, the appar-
ent paradox deepens.
Butjust what does it mean to say that the right to private property
is "an elementary basic right"? It is tempting to answer that the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has done what the U.S. Supreme Court has
refused to do in recent history and what conservative scholars like Ep-
stein have urged it to do-that is, has recognized the status of prop-
erty as a fundamental personal right, equal in rank and stature to
personal liberties of speech, religion, and the rest, and as a primary
legal tool in the effort to resist redistributive governmental measures.
If that were in fact the case, then the different positions of property
under the American and German Constitutions would indeed be par-
adoxical and would provide American constitutional scholars who
have defended the existing two-tier system of rights with reason to re-
consider whether property ought to continue to hold its less-than-fun-
damental position.
In this Article, I will argue that there is indeed an asymmetry be-
tween the German and American constitutional treatments of prop-
erty, but not that identified by the commentators. The problem stems
from the way the question is framed. Rather than asking whether or
not property is a fundamental right tout court under either the Ger-
man or the American Constitutions, the inquiry should focus on two
20 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14(1) (F.R.G.).
21 BVerfGE 24, 367 (389) (Hamburg Flood Control Case, 1968). Unlike American
practice, the official reports of the Constitutional Court do not give official names to the
cases. The names provided here in parentheses are based either on common German
reference or on identification provided in the leading English-language works on German
constitutional law. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY (1994); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2d ed. 1997).
22 BVerfGE 50, 290 (339) (Codetermination Case, 1979).
23 CURRIE, supra note 21, at 290. Sorie commentators have taken the view that the
U.S. Supreme Court in fact has been quite protective of property interests, using the First
Amendment and other provisions that protect ostensibly political rights rather than using
the Takings or Due Process Clauses. SeeJohn B. Attanasio, Personal Freedoms and Economic
Liberties: American Judicial Policy, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw 221, 237-40 (Paul Kirchhof
& Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
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closely related matters. First, assuming that the interest involved qual-
ifies as "property" within the meaning of their constitutional texts, do
German or American courts, in assessing the degree of protection that
property rights warrant under their constitutions, explicitly discuss the
primary purpose or function that they attribute to property rights as a
general matter? Stated more simply, is their analysis of the constitu-
tional status of property purposive? Second, do German or American
courts focus on the values and functions implicated by the particular
interest immediately involved? In other words, is their approach con-
textual? The answers to both questions reveal the core differences
between the German and American approaches on the status of prop-
erty as a constitutional right. The German Constitutional Court has
adopted an approach that is both purposive and contextual, while the
U.S. Supreme Court has not.
The first question recognizes that the institution of property has
multiple potential purposes and that the level of constitutional protec-
tion accorded to property-indeed, the basic question whether consti-
tutionally to protect property at all-depends on what purpose or
purposes the legal system involved has historically assigned to prop-
erty. Property rights are epiphenomenal. They are not ends in them-
selves but rather an instrument designed to instantiate and serve
deeper substantive values, such as wealth maximization, personal pri-
vacy, and individual self-realization. In this sense property rights are
never "fundamental." Only the substantive interests they serve can be.
The second question recognizes that, in the realm of property,
contingency accompanies multiplicity. Just as there are multiple po-
tential purposes that the general institution of property may serve, so
there are different functions associated with different types of particu-
lar property interests. One type of property interest may primarily
protect economic goals like wealth maximization, while another type
may primarily protect personal privacy. Whether, how, and why prop-
erty interests are constitutionally protected frequently depends on the
type of interest involved. Neither constitutional texts nor judicial
opinions typically draw such distinctions openly, but often the other
way to make sense of some individual judicial decision or group of
decisions is to pay attention to the sort of interest that is immediately
at stake. More to the point, the level of constitutional protection that
courts grant to property both does and, this Article argues, should
depend on the interest involved and the core purpose the court asso-
ciates with that type of property interest.
These two questions illuminate the real difference between Ger-
man and American constitutional property law. While American
courts generally do not recognize (at least not openly) the functional
differences just drawn, the German Constitutional Court sharply and
[Vol. 88:733
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explicitly does. 24 The German court distinguishes between those
property interests whose function is primarily or even exclusively eco-
nomic, especially wealth-creating, and those that primarily serve a
noneconomic interest relating to the owner's status as a moral or po-
litical agent. 25 Only the latter are protected as fundamental constitu-
tional interests. 26 Stated differently, it is a mistake to say that the
German constitution, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court,
treats property as a fundamental right across the board. In German
constitutional law, property is a fundamental right that is accorded
the highest degree of protection only in cases in which the affected
interest immediately at stake implicates the owner's ability to act as an
autonomous moral and political agent. Stated yet another way, Ger-
man constitutional law treats property as a derivative, or instrumental,
value in the general constitutional scheme. It strongly protects a par-
ticular property interest only to the extent that the interest immedi-
ately serves other, primary constitutional values-in particular, human
dignity and self-governance.
German constitutionalism does not view the right of property as a
matter of protecting subjective preferences. Nor does it recognize
property as a basic right for the purpose of blocking legislative or reg-
ulatory redistributive measures that frustrate the full satisfaction of in-
dividual preferences. It is not, in short, designed to instantiate the
neo-classical vision of the minimalist "night-watchman" state. 27 Its
purpose instead is more moral and civic than it is economic. The
moral dimension of property is that it is basic insofar as it implicates
the values of human dignity and self-governance. The civic dimension
is that property is the material basis for realizing a preexisting under-
standing of the proper social order. Stated differently, the German
constitutional right of property is not a Lockean right, but a right that
fuses the traditions of Kantian liberalism and civic republicanism. It is
a conception of property that I have called "proprietarian."2 8
Examining the German approach to constitutional protection of
property provides a basis for critiquing and rethinking existing Ameri-
can constitutional property doctrine. To know whether we should
characterize a right as fundamental, we need to know why we value
that right. In the case of property rights, as is so often the case with
constitutional rights, this is often not clearly expressed. I want to sug-
gest that, when we look at the Supreme Court's recent takings cases,
24 See infra Part III.
25 See infra Part II.A.
26 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27 The best expression of that vision remains ROBERT NOziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA 26-28 (1974).
28 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROP-
ERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997).
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it becomes clear that the characterization of German constitutional
law as highly property-protective and American constitutional law as
relegating property rights to the status of a poor cousin is a gross and
inaccurate generalization. As other commentators have noted, recent
takings jurisprudence has begun in some respects to resemble the
highly property-protective stance of the Lochner-era Court.29 The con-
stitutional tools have changed, from substantive due process to tak-
ings, but the net results are often similar.30 The Court has done this
through Lochner-like close scrutiny of the relationship between regula-
tory means and legislative ends and through a heightened burden of
proof regarding the causal connection between the affected owner's
conduct and the harm to be remedied. 31 This mode of analysis leaves
no room for distinguishing among different sorts of property interests
on the basis of their functions. The Court has gradually expanded the
range of protected interests with no discussion of the function served
by the particular interest. In fact, however, the interests that have
gained greater protection under the new heightened scrutiny are
strictly commercial or entrepreneurial in character.
Here, then, is the major difference between German and Ameri-
can constitutional property law. The difference is not that, in the
United States, property is a poor relation to such fundamental civil
rights as speech, association, and travel. Rather, the difference is that
property interests that would receive minimal protection under Ger-
man constitutional law because they do not immediately implicate the
fundamental values of human dignity and self-realization receive in-
creasingly strong protection under American constitutional law.32
Land held for the sole purpose of market speculation is as apt under
the U.S. Constitution, perhaps more apt, to receive strong protection
as is a tenant's interest in remaining in her home. 33
29 See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Im-
pact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996). Brownstein insists that
in a variety of circumstances, property receives favorable, or at least roughly
equivalent, treatment in comparison to the protection provided personal
liberty rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equal protec-
tion rights or procedural due process .... Indeed, the direction of the case
law seems to clearly favor property as opposed to personal liberty and equal-
ity interests.
Brownstein, supra note 12, at 53.
30 See McUsic, supra note 29, at 608-09 ("The similarity between the Court's current
[takings] jurisprudence and the Lochnerjurisprudence lies not in the amount or type of
legislation at risk but the proportion of redistributive legislation put at risk.").
31 This dual-focused form of scrutiny is the upshot of the Court's decisions in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987).
32 See discussion infra Part III.B.
33 See William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398
(1993).
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Part I of this Article briefly describes the relationship among
three German legal concepts: its constitution, its social state, and its
conception of the human self, or personality. Understanding how the
German Constitution is related to the ideas of the social state and the
human personality is essential to grasping the meaning of property as
a preferred right in German constitutional law. Part II then examines
Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, the central property clause of the Consti-
tution, and its interpretation by the German Constitutional Court.
Part III considers the differences between German and American ap-
proaches to the problem of determining when government actions
constitute impermissible takings of property. Part IV discusses some
normative implications of the comparative study. Perhaps the most
important of these is that politically progressive legal scholars should
not categorically oppose extending strong constitutional protection to
property. As the German example illustrates, property as a fundamen-
tal right need not have antiredistributive consequences and may in
fact advance a progressive vision. A brief coda about morphing consti-
tutions and the aims and limits of comparative constitutional analysis
completes the Article.
I
THE BASIc LAW, THE SOZIALSTAAT, AND THE "IMAGE
OF MAN"
It is commonly said that the German Basic Law is neutral with
respect to particular economic systems. "Even a socialized economy,"
one noted scholar wrote, "would not violate the Constitution, since
[A]rticle 15 . . . allows it under specific conditions. '34 Whether the
Constitution can properly be read to permit a "full-blown socialist so-
ciety" is debatable, but the Constitution clearly does not block socialist
legislation. 35 The 1949 German Constitution created not only a Recht-
staat (state governed by the rule of law), but, equally important, a Sozi-
alstaat (social welfare state). 36 Far from perceiving any tension
between these two ideals, the Constitution contemplates that the two
are mutually reinforcing. Thus, Article 20 defines Germany as a "so-
cial federal state," while Article 28(1) requires the creation of a legal
regime that is consistent with "the principles of a republican, demo-
cratic, and social state characterized by the rule of law [sozialer Recht-
staat] .37 This does not mean that the Basic Law serves as a complete
34 Ernst Karl Pakuscher, Judicial Review of Executive Acts in Economic Affairs in Germany,
20J. PUB. L. 273, 274 (1971).
35 See KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 242-43.
36 See id. at 241-42.
37 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 20(1), 28(1) (F.R.G.).
2003]
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economic, as well as political constitution, but it does create a general
framework for the state's responsibility in the economic realm.
The basic substantive idea underlying the Sozialstaat is that the
government has a responsibility to provide for the basic needs of all its
citizens."' Although the Basic Law embraces a modern version of this
idea, its roots extend much further back in German history. It can be
traced back to the Lutheran idea that the relationship between the
prince and his people is one of mutual obligation: The people owe
allegiance to the prince, but the prince in turn is obligated to provide
for the welfare of his people. 39 This idea is a theme that recurs
throughout German constitutional history. It is evident, for example,
in the remarkable Allgemeines Landrecht der Preufischen Staaten, the
comprehensive code for the Prussian States, completed in 1794.40 Al-
though it would be anachronistic to say that the Prussian Code cre-
ate'd anything like the modern welfare state, the Code certainly
reflected a continuing commitment to the idea of the state's responsi-
bility to secure the people's basic needs.41 A more modern version of
the Sozialstaat dates to the social welfarist reforms adopted in Prussia
between 1830 and 1840. The significance of these legislative measures
is the fact that in an age of liberalism, the state intervened in the pub-
lic sector for the first time, thereby creating a precedent for future
intervention. The social legislation of the Bismarck era and, later, the
Weimar Republic greatly deepened and extended the reach of the
state's intervention. 42 Today, the concept of the Sozialstaat embraces
not only the responsibility to provide a social "safety net," as that term
is understood in the United States, but further, to redistribute
wealth. 43 The notion that the public's welfare depends upon assuring
that no one lives in poverty and upon avoiding gross inequalities in
the social distribution of wealth, while heretical in most American cir-
cles, is relatively uncontroversial in Germany today.44 As one German
legal scholar put it, it is "well-established knowledge [ ] that the social
situation of the people improves, if and as far as everybody shares the
results of what has been produced by society. '45.
Although some uncertainty exists as to whether the commitment
to the social welfare state imposes affirmative duties on the state to
38 KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 35.
39 See id. at 41.
40 On the Prussian Code, see FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE
260-66 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1995).
41 See Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century, 1989
SuP. CT. REV. 311, 321.
42 See KOMMERS, supyra note 21, at 35.
43 Ulrich Karpen, The Constitution in the Face of Economic and Social Progress, in NEW
CHALLENGES TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 87, 91-92 (Christian Starck ed., 1991).
44 See ULRICHi KARPEN, SOZIALE MARKTWIRTSCIIAFT UND GRUNDGESETZ 14 (1990).
45 Karpen, supra note 43, at 90.
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provide particular benefits to all citizens or merely authorizes the state
to do so, the majority legal opinion in Germany today is that the state
is under a constitutional obligation to guarantee a minimal subsis-
tence for individual citizens. 46 At the same time, there is growing real-
ization in Germany today that there are limits to what the state can
realistically provide, and an increasing number of Germans now be-
lieve that Germany may have already reached (or indeed exceeded)
those limits. Still, there is no sense that the existence of limits under-
mines that basic commitment to the social welfare state. 47
The commitment to the social welfare state has to be understood
in connection with the most basic commitment in the entire German
constitution-the commitment to the principle of human dignity
(Menschenwiirde). It is no coincidence that the first article of the Basic
Law states that "[t] he dignity of man is inviolable. It is to be respected
and safeguarded with the full authority of the State. '48 The German
Basic Law views basic rights hierarchically, and the right to human
dignity is the bedrock of all other constitutional rights: "Human dig-
nity," the Constitutional Court has unambiguously stated, "is at the
very top of the value order of the Basic Law." 49 Therefore, one could
conclude that the German courts regard the right to human dignity as
pre-political, objective, and, indeed, transcendental.
From an American perspective, the core challenge would seem to
be reconciling the human dignity principle with the commitment to
the Sozialstaat-reconciling, that is, Article 1 with Article 20. To
American ears, "human dignity" strongly resonates of the individualist
outlook associated with classical liberalism, making the constitutional
right negative rather than positive in character. From that perspec-
tive, the interventionist character of the Sozialstaat might be thought
to contradict the commitment to individual human dignity.
From the German perspective, however, this is a false trade-off.5°1
The conception of human dignity that Article 1 embraces is not that
of classical individualism. Individual human dignity exists in a social
and economic context. It cannot be fully and meaningfully protected
without attending to the concrete conditions in which individuals live.
One professor observes that "social conditions ... determine the ex-
46 See Kurt Sontheimer, Principles of Human Dignity in the Federal Republic, in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW, supra note 23, at 213, 216.
47 In the recent elections in the German Land of Baden-Wfirttemberg, for example,
the SPD, a center-left party that is the main opposition party in the German Parliament,
campaigned on a platform whose slogan was "Sozialstaat: Reformen-Ja! Abbau-Nein.'
("The Social Welfare State: Reform, Yes! Dismantling, No!").
48 GRUNDGESE-rZ [GG] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.).
49 BVerfGE 27, 1(6) (Microcensus Case, 1969).
50 Indeed, Article 79(3) of the Basic Law provides that these two provisions are im-
mune from any constitutional amendment.
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tent to which the individual is truly able to safeguard his own human
dignity."51
The social aspect of human dignity is evident in the German con-
cept of the "image of man"-that is, the nature of the human person-
ality. This concept, which is central to the German Constitutional
Court's dignitarian jurisprudence, defines the human personality as
community-centered. Thus, the Constitutional Court early And explic-
itly stated that
[t] he image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sover-
eign individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in favor of a rela-
tionship between individual and community in the sense of a
person's dependence on and commitment to the community, with-
out infringing upon a person's individual value. 52
Ernst Benda, the distinguished and influential former president
(chief justice) of the Constitutional Court's First Senate,5 has noted
that the Basic Law rejects the "individualistic conception of man de-
rived from classical liberalism as well as the collectivist view."'54 Per-
haps the most accurate description of this conception of the self is to
say that it combines the Kantian injunction against treating people as
means rather than ends55 with a strongly communitarian ontology.
56
There are also strong parallels between the German conception of the
relationship between the self and property and the role of property in
civic republican thought. Republican theory, like German constitu-
tional theory, valued property as the source of personal independence
necessary for proper self-development and responsible citizenship. 57
51 Sontheimer, supra note 46, at 215.
52 BVerfGE 4, 7 (15-16) (Investment Aid Case, 1954).
5"3 The Constitutional Court is divided into two eight-member panels, called senates,
which have mutually exclusive jurisdiction and membership. See KOMMERS, supra note 21,
at 16-17. In cases of jurisdictional conflict, the two senates meet together as a single Ple-
nm.n. Id. Each senate is headed by the equivalent of a chief justice; traditionally, the
president heads the First Senate, while the vice-presideni heads the Second Senate. See id.
at 17. The two-senate structure represents a compromise from an old debate over the
character of the Constitutional Court as a legal or a political institution. See id. at 17.
54 ERNST BENDA ET AL., HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS 9 (1984).
55 For a rich discussion of the Kantian roots of the German constitutional "image of
man," see G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV.
171, 178-82 (1984).
56 See KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 241. The communitarian theories that seem most
compatible with the Basic Law's image-of-man idea are those of Michael Sandel and
Charles Taylor. See LBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); Michael J.
Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1994); Charles Taylor, Cross-Pur-
poses: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM & THE MORAL LIFE 159 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 1989).
57 SeeJ.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 463 (1975); Gregory S. Alexander,
Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 286-87
(1991).
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II
ARTICLE 14 AND THE ROLE OF PROPERTY
A. Property and Self-Development
The relevance of the Constitution's commitment to the Sozialstaat
for understanding the meaning of property under the German Consti-
tution should be apparent by now. The Sozialstaat and the principle of
human dignity lay the foundation for a particular way of understand-
ing the core purpose of property rights. This theory holds that the
core purpose of property is not wealth maximization or the satisfac-
tion of individual preferences, as the American economic theory of
property holds,58 but self-realization, or self-development, in an objec-
tive, distinctly moral and civic sense. That is, property is fundamental
insofar as it is necessary for individuals to develop fully both as moral
agents and participating members of the broader community.
The clearest exposition of this self-developmental theory of prop-
erty was in the famous 1968 "Hamburg Flood Control Case. '59 The
case involved a challenge to a 1964 statute enacted by the city-state of
Hamburg converting into public property all grassland that the state
classified as "dikeland."60 The statute terminated private ownership of
such lands, but it did require that owners be compensated. 6 1 Several
owners of dikeland claimed that the statute violated their fundamen-
tal right to property under Article 14.62
The basis of this claim illustrates one major difference between
the American and German approaches to constitutionally protected
property. Under the American Constitution, if the amount of com-
pensation were adequate (and there was no allegation in the case that
it was not), there simply would be no basis for a constitutional chal-
lenge at all. The purpose of the Hamburg government's measure was
to build an effective system of dikes in the wake of the devastating
floods that hit Hamburg in 196263-certainly a sufficiently public pur-
pose to satisfy the weak American "public use" requirement.64 Under
the American Takings Clause, once the publicness of the governmen-
tal encroachment and the sufficiency of monetary compensation have
58 For a modern classical expression of the economic theory, see Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
59 BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968).
60 See id. at 368-70.
61 See id. at 373-74.
62 See id. at 374.
63 See id. at 403.
64 The standard datum cited to evidence the weakness of the public-use requirement
under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467
U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding in an 8-0 decision the state's scheme to transfer title to land,
with compensation, from private parties to other private parties, because the Act served the
public purpose of reducing concentration of land ownership).
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been satisfied, there is no basis for constitutionally challenging the
measure. Monetary (or other) compensation is always an adequate
substitute for the thing itself.
Not so under the German Constitution. Article 14 is understood
to guarantee not merely the monetary value of property, but extant
ownership itself. The Constitutional Court expressly recognized this
in its opinion, when it stated the following: "The function of Article 14
is not primarily to prevent the taking of property without compensa-
tion-although in this respect it offers greater protection than Article
153 of the Weimar Constitution-but rather to secure existing property in
the hands of its owner."'65 This is the central meaning of the statement
in Article 14(1) that "[p]roperty [is] guaranteed. '66 Given this view
that the Basic Law protects property itself, not just its monetary
equivalent, it is easy to understand why commentators have stated that
property is a more important value under the German constitution
than it is under the American Takings or Due Process Clauses. But
what needs to be asked is why the German Basic Law protects existing
property relationships themselves.
The answer is that German constitutional jurisprudence does not
treat property as a market commodity, but as a civil, and one may say,
civic right. The Court in the "Hamburg Flood Control Case" made it
clear that the core purpose of property as a basic constitutional right
is not economic, but is personal and moral. The Court stated,
To hold that property is an elementary constitutional right
must be seen in the close context of protection of personal liberty.
Within the general system of constitutional rights, its function is to
secure its holder a sphere of liberty in the economic field and thereby
enable him to lead a self-governing life.6 7
The last phrase signals the animating idea behind the constitu-
tional role of property under the German Basic Law: self-governance.
Property is a necessary condition for autonomous individuals to expe-
rience control over their own lives. Without property, they lack the
material means necessary for a full and healthy development of their
65 BVerfGE 24 at 389 (emphasis added). Article 153 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution
was the basis for some aspects of Article 14 of the post-World War 11 Basic Law. A number
of important differences existed, however, between the treatment of property under the
two constitutions, including the fact that, by not allowing compensated expropriations to
be judicially challenged, the Weimar Constitution did not protect the institution of prop-
erty as such. Under the Weimar Constitution, compensation was always an adequate substi-
tute for the thing itself. See Hans-Jurgen Papier, Die Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 I 1, in 2
GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 18-23 (Theodor Maunz et al. eds., rev. 2001). On the weakness
of basic rights under the Weimar Constitution generally, see Volkmar G6tz, Legislative and
Executive Power Under the Constitutional Requirements Entailed in the Principle of the Rule of Law,
in NEW CHALLENGES TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra note 43, at 141, 150-52.
66 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art.14(l) (F.R.G.).
67 BVerfGE 24 at 389 (emphasis added).
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personality. The Court made the connection between property and
personhood explicit in its opinion when it stated that "the property
guarantee under Article 14(1) (2) must be seen in relationship to the
personhood of the owner-that is, to the realm of freedom within
which persons engage in self-defining, responsible activity."68
The Court here is invoking an understanding of the function of
property that in some respects echoes discussions of "personhood" by
some recent American scholars, most notably Margaret Jane Radin,
drawing on Hegel, and C. Edwin Baker. 69 As Radin explains, the pre-
mise of this understanding is that "to achieve proper self-develop-
ment-to be a person-an individual needs some control over
resources in the external environment.17 0 The purpose of legal prop-
erty rights, then, is to secure the requisite degree of control-self-de-
termination-as a necessary means of facilitating self-development.
This theory is most closely associated with Hegel,7' but Hegel and his
followers were by no means the first or the only political philosophers
to explain and justify property rights on the basis of the proper devel-
opment of the self. Rousseau, for example, developed a comparable
theory of property that stressed the importance of property to proper
and full development of the personality.7 2 For Rousseau, private own-
ership was morally justifiable only to the extent that it fulfilled that
function. 73
As the Constitutional Court's opinion makes clear, the German
idea of the constitutional property right shares with the self-develop-
mental tradition a conception of liberty that differs from the classical
Anglo-American understanding of that term. Borrowing the distinc-
tion made famous by Isaiah Berlin,7 4 one can say that German consti-
tutional law, like the Hegelian theory of property and the self,
understands liberty in its positive as well as negative sense-that is,
freedom to rather than freedom from. 75 It may be more accurate to
68 Id. In the immediate case, the court decided that the compensated expropriation
of dikelands did not violate the owners' basic rights because it satisfied the requirement of
Article 14(3), that expropriations be made only for "the public weal" (Wohle der
Aligemeinheit). See id. at 403. More specifically, it was not a redistribution of land made for
general reasons but an appropriate response to a particular problem affecting the public
good. See id. at 410-13.
69 See Baker, supra note 12, at 746-47; MargaretJane Radin, Pnoperty and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
70 Radin, supra note 69, at 957.
71 On Hegel's view of property and its relation to work and politics, see ALAN RYAN,
PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 118-41 (1984).
72 See id. at 49-72 (discussing Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views on work and property).
73 See id.
74 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY passim (1958).
75 It is important to be very careful here, however. It is not clear to what extent public
assistance, what we would call welfare aid, is protected as "ownership" under Article 14.
Social security interests are protected in Germany today, but these accrue by virtue of em-
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describe the German constitutional conception of liberty, in its rela-
tion to property, as blending the positive and negative dimensions.
The individual owner's freedom from external interference with his
property is valued just because it is a precondition for him to act in a
way that is necessary for realization of the self. Put differently, prop-
erty and liberty are connected with each other, not solely through a
politics of fear of the state, but through a politics of enabling self-
governance. The point of protecting individual ownership is not to
create a zone of security from a powerful and threatening state, but to
make it possible for individuals to realize their own human potential.
The German constitutional commitments to both human dignity
and the Sozialstaat clearly influence the way in which the Constitu-
tional Court understands the relationship between property and self-
development. The Court views considerations of individual welfare as
integrally related to the proper self-development of citizens, who are
not isolated agents but members of society. Welfare is less a matter of
guaranteeing that the distribution of wealth throughout society is
morally optimal than it is of securing the material conditions neces-
sary for the proper development of individuals as responsible and self-
governing members of society.
B. Property as Dynamic and Social: The "Social Obligation" of
Ownership
This conception of property as the basis for proper self-develop-
ment has produced two defining characteristics of German constitu-
tional property jurisprudence. The Constitution's treatment of
property, both textually and as interpreted by the courts, is function-
ally dynamic and socially based. It is functionally dynamic in the sense
that the courts consider social and economic changes that have af-
fected the purposes that particular resources serve over time. An in-
fluential treatise on German constitutional law aptly captures this
focus on the functional change of property and its relevance to consti-
tutional protection:
As a basis for the individual existence and individual conduct of
life as well as a principle of social order, the individual ownership of
property has lost its importance. Modern life is based only to a lim-
ited extent on the individual power of disposition as the basis for
individual existence, with respect, for example, to the peasant farm
or the family enterprise. The basis for individual existence is usually
ployment. See PETER KRAUSE, EIGENTUM AN SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN REGHTEN 65-66
(1982); 1 FRITZ OSSENBOHL, FESTSCHRIFT FOR W. ZEIDLER 625 (1987). Similarly, the Sozial-
staatsprinzip (principle of social justice) of Article 20 does not create subjective rights, but
instead establishes a goal for the state to pursue through the legislature. See BVerfGE 27,
253 (283) (1969); BVerfGE 41, 126 (153-54) (1976); BVerfGE 82, 60 (80) (1990).
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no longer private property as determined by private law, but the
produce of one's own work and participation in the benefits of the
welfare state.
76
The relevance of functional changes of property to constitutional
protection is illustrated by the "Small Garden Plot Case" (Klein-
gartenentscheidung) . 7 7 In that case, the Court struck down a federal
statute that severely limited the right of landowners to terminate gar-
den leases. 78 The historical background of the statute as well as
changes in social conditions are crucial to understanding the deci-
sion. At one time in German history it was common for large land-
owners, particularly on the outskirts of cities, to lease to people who
owned little or no land small plots for the purpose of small gardens. 79
These garden plots were an important method of feeding the German
public.8 0 As the dominant means of agricultural production shifted to
large-scale commercial production, these individual garden plots lost
their original social purpose and indeed became something of an
anachronism. The individual landowners in the case wanted to
change the use of their land from agricultural purposes to commer-
cial development because the amount of annual rent from the lease-
hold had become insubstantial. 8 1 They applied for a permit to
terminate the garden leases on their land, but the regulatory agency
refused to grant the permit because the federal statute did not recog-
nize this sort of change of circumstance as a permissible basis for
terminating leases. 8 2 The Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because the magnitude of the restriction on the owner's free-
dom of use was disproportionate to the public purpose to be served. 83
Although these garden allotments originally functioned to provide a
source of food in times of social emergency, the purpose had by mod-
ern times become no more than a source of recreation, a social func-
tion that the Court regarded as decidedly less weighty than its original
purpose.8 4 Comparing the weakness of the new function with the se-
76 KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCH-
LAND 192 (20th ed. 1995).
77 BVerfGE 52, 1 (1979).
78 See id. at 1-2.
79 See id. at 2.
80 See id. at 3.
81 See id. at 12.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 29. The principle of proportionality (Verhd1tnismii/3igkeit), although no-
where expressly mentioned in the Constitution, is a fundamental aspect of German consti-
tutional jurisprudence. It is derived from the rule of law ideal (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and has a
long history predating the 1949 Basic Law. For a good summary of its origins and role, see
CURRIE, supra note 21, at 307-10.
84 See BVerfGE 52 at 34-35.
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verity of the restriction on the owners' use, the Court had little diffi-
culty in concluding that the statute was unconstitutional.8 5
The "Small Garden Plot Case" also illustrates the other character-
istic of German constitutional property jurisprudence: its perception
of private ownership as being "socially tied," as the Constitutional
Court put it.86 A provision in the Basic Law's property clause, which
finds no real analogy in the American Constitution, forms the basis
for this conception of private property as socially obligated.87 Article
14(2) provides the following: "Property entails obligations. Its use
shall also serve the common good."88 Although the Court has yet to
define the precise scope of this "social obligation of ownership," it is
clear that the clause is understood as something more than the idea
expressed in the familiar common-law apothegm, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (so use your own as not to injure another's prop-
erty). The social obligation of ownership is intended to express the
idea that private property rights are always subordinate to the public
interest' - This idea was more fully expressed in the original draft of
Article 14(2), which reads as follows: "Ownership entails a social obli-
gation. Its use shall find its limits in the living necessities of all citizens
and in the public order essential to society."90 That the social obliga-
tion recognized in Article 14(2) is broader than the minimal duty to
avoid creating a public nuisance is clear from various decisions of the
Constitutional Court. The social obligation (Sozialverpflichtung) was
the basis for the Court's statements recognizing the constitutional le-
gitimacy of certain forms of rent controlP1 and anti-eviction
regulations.92
From an American perspective, perhaps the most striking sign of
the broad reach of the social obligation is the important
85 See id. at 36-40.
86 See id. at 29.
87 For a recent and stimulating argument that the American Constitution should also
treat private property as socially obligated, see Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive jus-
tice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 767-92 (1999).
88 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14(2) (F.R.C.).
89 Hanno Kube has argued that in the context of natural resources, German courts
have interpreted Article 14's social obligation clause in a way that tracks the Anglo-Ameri-
can public-trust doctrine. See Hanno Kube, Private Property in Natural Resources and the Public
Weal in German Law-Latent Similarities to the Public Trust Doctrine?, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J.
857 (1997). For a fuller exposition of his theory, see HANNO KUBE, EIGENTUM AN
NATURGOTERN: ZUORDNUNG UND UNVERFOGBARKEIT [Property in Natural Resources: Coor-
dination and Undisposability] 189-203 (1998). The seminal article on the public trust
doctrine is, of course, Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effec-
tive Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
90 See RUDOLF DOLZER, INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NATURAL RES.,
PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION INHERENT IN OWNERSHIP 17 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91 See BVerfGE 37, 132 (139-43) (Tenancy and Rent Control Case, 1974).
92 See BVerfGE 68, 361 (367-71) (1985).
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"Codetermination Case" (Mitbestimmungsentscheidung).9- That case in-
volved a challenge to the constitutional validity of the federal
Codetermination Act of 1976, an extremely important piece of legisla-
tion regulating the relationship between labor and management in
German industries.9 4 The Act mandates worker representation on the
boards of directors of large firms, defined as firms with two thousand
or more employees. 95 It further requires that the firm's legal repre-
sentatives and its primary labor director be selected by the supervisory
board according to specified procedures, and it requires that the
board's chair and vice-chair be elected by a two-thirds majority.9 6
The ostensible purpose of the Act was to extend and strengthen
worker participation in the governance of business enterprises, a prac-
tice that has a long history in German labor-management relations. 97
Anyone who has read James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's famous
book, The Calculus of Consent,98 however, may be tempted to react
skeptically to that explanation. A public-choice analysis of the Act
would simply see it as a clear instance of rent-seeking legislation, sup-
ported by an obviously well-organized and intensely political interest
group. That may indeed have been the real basis for the Act, but the
German Constitutional Court did not think so. Squarely addressing
the public-choice reading (although not calling it by that term), the
Court stated that the Codetermination Act
does not merely serve a pure group interest. Rather, the co-opera-
tion and integration aimed at by institutional co-participation ...
have general importance in social policy; co-participation has espe-
cially been regarded as calculated to secure the market economy
politically.... [I] t is intended to serve the welfare of the public. It
cannot be regarded as unsuitable or not necessary to achieve this
purpose .... 99
The plaintiffs, which included a large number of business firms
and employers' associations, attacked the Act as a gross interference
with their property rights.'0 0 They argued that the Act violated the
constitutional property rights of shareholders and of the firms them-
selves under Article 14 of the Basic Law as well as under other consti-
tutional guarantees.'0 1 Rejecting this claim, the Constitutional Court
93 BVerfGE 50, 290 (Codetermination Case, 1979).
94 See id. at 294.
95 See id. at 299-302.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 294.
98 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
99 2 CEC (CCH) 324, 366 (1979) (translating BVerfGE 50, 290).
100 See id. at 332-38.
101 See id. Other grounds for the challenge included interference with the rights of
occupation (Article 12) and association (Article 9). See id. at 337-38. There is a substantial
degree of interrelationship between Articles 12 and 14. For a lucid discussion, see Fritz
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concluded that the Act was merely an exercise of the legislature's
power under Article 14(1) to define the "contents and limits" of prop-
erty.10 2 By implication, the Court concluded that the Act did not vio-
late the injunction of Article 19(2) that "the essence of a basic right
[not] be encroached upon."'0 3 The Court stated that although the
Act admittedly reduced the powers of shareholders as members of the
supervising board, the restriction "keeps within the bounds of a consti-
tutionally permissible social binding."'1 4 Article 14(2) makes clear,
the Court pointed out, that "use and disposal do not remain merely
within the sphere of the [individual] owner, but affect interests of
other persons entitled to rights who are dependent on the use of the
[particular] property object."' 0 5 The magnitude of an owner's social
commitment under Article 14 varies with the social importance of the
asset and its contemporary purpose.10 6 As the Constitutional Court
stated,
It accords with these principles if property [obligations] (Eigen-
tumsbindungen) must always be proportionate. A statutory property
binding must be dictated on the basis of the area of activity regu-
lated and must not go any further than the protective aim which the
regulation serves. In this respect, limits are set all the more tightly
on the legislator, the more the use and disposal of property remain
within the sphere of the owner, since, in that case, a purpose extra-
neous to the latter which could justify a "proportionate" property
[obligation] will be harder to find. Altogether the legislator's area
of discretion in the case of social relation and in the case of social
function of the property is thus relatively wide in view of its social
[obligation]; it becomes narrower if these conditions are not pre-
sent or are present only to a limited extent. 10 7
Applying this sliding-scale approach, the Court reasoned that
the important social function of share property is obvious for all to
see. Its social relation shows itself in the mere fact that, as a general
rule, it consists in the mutual participation with others in a company
which is the owner of the means of production. Above all, in order
to use the share property, the collaboration of the workers is always
needed[.] 108
Ossenbuhl, Economic and Occupational Rights, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw, supra note 23,
at 251.
102 See 2 CEC (CCH) at 358-65.
103 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19(2) (F.R.G.).
104 2 CEC (CCH) at 361.
105 Id. at 359 (footnotes omitted).
106 See Peter Badura, Eigentum, in HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS, supra note 54, at
653.
107 2 CEC (CCH) at 359-60 (footnotes omitted).
108 Id. at 364-65.
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Although the text of Article 14 speaks only of "property" and
seemingly does not distinguish among various sorts of property, the
Constitutional Court has in fact drawn such qualitative distinctions.
The "Codetermination Case" and "Small Garden Plot Case," read to-
gether, allow one to say that the Court distinguishes among different
categories of property, creating a kind of hierarchy among types of
resources. The sliding-scale approach to evaluating the magnitude of
the social obligation and the social function of property is the basis for
this ordering of property. This is the primary means by which the
Court has cabined the social obligation, which otherwise would seem
to be the proverbial unruly horse. Greater legislative power is recog-
nized over socially important assets like corporate stock than over
small garden plots used for leisure.
III
THE SOURCE AND MEANING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
This Part analyzes two lines of cases in which the German Consti-
tutional Court has discussed and identified the source and substantive
meaning of property for constitutional purposes. As discussed in sub-
part A, one line of cases deals with environmental regulations. Here,
the question has concerned the constitutional status of natural re-
sources that the Constitutional Court, following legislative signals,
deems essential to human life and thus not subject to exclusive indi-
vidual control. The other line of cases, discussed in subpart B, arises
out of the question whether and to what extent government-provided
welfare assistance benefits are protected as property under Article 14.
These two lines of cases indicate two important differences be-
tween the American and German approaches to constitutional prop-
erty. The first of these differences concerns the source of
constitutional property. The German Court has unambiguously re-
jected a positivist approach to the question of what is or are the
sources of property interests protected under Article 14.109 In deter-
mining whether or not an asserted interest is property for constitu-
tional purposes, the Court looks not only to nonconstitutional,
private-law sources, but also to the values of the Basic Law as a
whole.' 10 As a result, property in its constitutional sense is not limited
to those interests that private law defines as property.
The second vital difference between the American and German
approaches concerns the substantive purpose of constitutional protec-
tion of property. The German Court, unlike its American counter-
part, rejects an interpretation of the property clause that views
109 See discussion infta Part IlIIA.
110 See infta notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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aggregate wealth maximization, individual-preference satisfaction, or
individual liberty (in its classical, or negative, sense) as the primary
purpose of constitutionally protected property interests.ll' The pri-
mary reason for protecting property as a fundamental right under the
German Constitution, rather, is to secure the material conditions nec-
essary for each person's self-development. 1 2
A. The Basic Law as the Source of Constitutional Property:
Environmental Regulation
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Constitutional
Court has been clear about the legal source used in defining what
interests are protected as constitutional property. 113 For Article 14
purposes, the Basic Law itself defines the meaning of the term "owner-
ship" (Eigentum). Constitutional property is not limited to those inter-
ests defined as property by nonconstitutional law (that is, the German
Civil Code.) 114 The Constitutional Court has clearly and consistently
stated that the term "ownership" (or "property") has a broader mean-
ing under Article 14 than it has for private law purposes under the
Civil Code." 15
Although the Court looks to the Basic Law to define the range of
protected interests, its approach is not one of direct textual interpreta-
tion. Rather, it identifies the substantive interests that animate the
Basic Law as a whole. These interests serve as criteria used to distin-
guish those interests that count as constitutional property from those
that do not. This strategy, although textually rooted, differs in impor-
tant ways from the "originalist" and "traditionalist" approaches fa-
vored by conservative American judges and constitutional scholars.
The German approach avoids temporally freezing the meaning of
constitutional property in any particular historical moment, permit-
ting Article 14's protection over time to embrace new and unprece-
dented sorts of interests.
III See discussion infra Part IIl.B.
112 See infra Part III.B.
113 For a lucid and insightful discussion of the muddled state of American constitu-
tional doctrine on this question, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885 (2000). The difference between the American and German
experiences may be due in part to the fact that the German Basic Law has a single property
clause and a single property-dependent doctrine, while the American Constitution has two
property clauses (the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) and three property-dependent
doctrines (the takings doctrine of the Fifth Amendment and the procedural-due-process
and substantive-due-process doctrines of the Fourteenth Amendment). Of course, the
mere existence of multiple references to property in the American Constitution does not
necessitate a multiplicity of meanings.
114 The Civil Code restricts the meaning of property to tangible, corporeal assets. See
§ 903 BGB.
115 See, e.g., BVerfGE 51, 193 (216-18) (Warenzeichensentschzeidung, 1979) (Trademark
Case); BVerfGE 58, 300 (334-36) (Nafiauskiesungsentscheidung, 1981) (Groundwater Cases).
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Behind this approach to defining the constitutional limits of gov-
ernmental power over property is a certain level of distrust of the mar-
ket as a reliable mechanism for serving the public good (Gemeinwoh)
with respect to particular sorts of resources. This has been especially
so with respect to natural resources. The Court has been remarkably
solicitous of environmental regulations aimed at protecting natural re-
sources that the Court has characterized as basic to human existence.
An important example of this development is the notorious series
of "Groundwater Cases" (Naflausskiesungsentscheidungen), litigated
before the federal Supreme Civil Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) as well as
the Constitutional Court. These cases, especially the Constitutional
Court's opinion, are among the most widely discussed constitutional
property cases in Germany of the past several decades and are worth
reflecting on to consider what they indicate about current German
legal attitudes toward property, the market, and the public weal." 16
The litigation concerned the constitutional validity of the 1976
amendments to the Federal Water Resources Act (Wasserhaushalt-
gesetz), first enacted in 1957.117 The most important of these amend-
ments was a provision requiring anyone wishing to make virtually any
use of surface or groundwater to obtain a permit.118 That amend-
ment represented an extension of the Act's basic premise, which de-
clared that
the attainment of a sensible and useful distribution of the surface
water and groundwater, in quantity and quality, for the whole Fed-
eral Republic ... [can be achieved only] if the free disposition by
private owners is restricted and if the interest of the public weal is
the starting point for all action. 119
Under the Act, the owner of the surface has no entitlement to such a
use permit; indeed, the permit must be denied wherever the proposed
use threatens the "public weal."'120
The plaintiff, who owned and operated a gravel pit, applied for a
permit to use the water beneath his land.121 He had previously taken
groundwater for decades for the purpose of extracting gravel, but the
city denied him permission to continue doing so because his quarry
116 For a sampling of views about the case, see Martin Burgi, Die Enteignung durch
"teilweisen" Rechtsentzug als Priifstein ftir die Eigentumsdogmatik, 6 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 527 (1994); Ingo Kraft, System der Klassifizierung eigentumsrelevanter
Regelungen, BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBIATrER, Feb. 15, 1994, at 97;Joachim Lege, DerRecht-
sweg bei Entschddigung ftir "enteignende" Wirkungen, 42 NEUE JURITISCHE WOCHENSCHRIIr
[New LawJournal] 2745 (1995).
117 See BVerfGE 58 at 301-02.
118 See id. at 305-06.
119 Schriftlicher Bericht des 2. Sonderausschusses-Wasserhaushaltsgesetz-BtDrs. II/
3536 (1953) [Record of the Parliamentary Debates of the Federal Water Resources Law].
120 See BVerfGE 58 at 304.
121 See id. at 309.
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operation threatened the city's water wells. 122 He sued for damages,
claiming that the permit denial was an uncompensated expropriation
of his property that is unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Basic
Law. 123
The federal Supreme Civil Court, the highest civil court in Ger-
many, held that the permit denial indeed violated the plaintiffs con-
stitutional property right and that the amendment to the Water
Resources Act was unconstitutional under Article 14(1).124 Under
German law, however, only the Constitutional Court has the authority
to declare statutes unconstitutional, 125 so the Supreme Civil Court was
required to submit the case to the Constitutional Court. The latter
Court held that the Water Resources Act was constitutional and that
the permit denial was not an expropriation of the plaintiffs constitu-
tionally protected property. 126 In the course of a long and extraordi-
narily complicated opinion, the Court squarely rejected a conception
of property that identifies as its primary function the maximization of
individual wealth. The Court stated, "From the constitutional guaran-
tee of property the owner cannot derive a right to be permitted to
make use of precisely that which promises the greatest possible eco-
nomic advantage."'127 The Court acknowledged that the constitu-
tional guarantee of property in Article 14(1) prohibits the legislature
from undermining the basic existence of the right embedded in the
private law of property in a way that removes or substantially impairs
the guaranteed zone of freedom under Article 14.128 The guarantee
of the legal institution of property, the Court continued, is not en-
croached on, however, when the security and defense of resources
that are vital to the common welfare of the public are placed under
the authority of the public, rather than the private, legal order. 29
Water is such a resource. The Court stated that, whatever the
meaning of ownership for private law purposes, the constitutional
meaning of land ownership has never entailed ownership of water be-
low the surface. 311 Legal rights concerning ground water are not de-
termined by, or at least not primarily by, the ordinary rules of
property law under the Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, or BGB),
because property rights in groundwater are inherently and historically
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See 45 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [New Law journal] 2290 (1978).
125 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art.100(2) (F.R.G.).
126 See BVerfGE 58 at 338-48.
127 Id. at 345.
128 See id. at 339.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 345.
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public, not private, in character. 131 Private rights in land end when
they reach the water level. 13 2 Consequently, the Water Resources Act,
in subjecting the owner's ability to exploit groundwater to a permit
system, did not take from landowners any property right (Anspruch)
that they ever had under the Constitution.
So, the German Constitutional Court regards water as special, too
important to be left completely to the market, or private ordering, to
allocate. One is left, though, to answer the nagging question of why
water is special. Why, exactly, do private property rights not extend to
groundwater in the same way that they do to land? A coherent, sub-
stantive answer to this question is absolutely necessary if one is to as-
suage the Supreme Civil Court's entirely understandable fear that
regulatory measures like the Federal Water Law have effectively erased
the line between the social obligation of ownership, on the one hand,
and expropriation, on the other. If regulatory measures limiting or
even eliminating private rights to resources can always be rationalized
as simply expressions of the Sozialbindung, then hardly any protection
against uncompensated expropriations under Article 14(3) would re-
main. The doctrine of regulatory takings (enteignungsgleicher Eingrif])
would be emptied of all content. In Justice Holmes's terms, it would
be impossible to say that a regulation "goes too far."'133
Unfortunately, it was just at this most crucial stage that the Consti-
tutional Court's analysis broke down. The Court relied on two factors,
history and social need, to explain why property rights in water are so
limited-why groundwater is essentially or inherently public in char-
acter. Historically, the Court pointed out, German private law has
separated property rights concerning land and water.134 This separa-
tion was constitutionally authorized at least since the time of the Ger-
man constitution of 1871, the Court noted. 3 5 Fine, but that does not
answer the question; it only changes the character of the question.
131 See id. The Supreme Civil Court had reasoned that ownership of land confers own-
ership of water below the land, see id. at 332, relying on a provision of the Civil Code that
states that "[t]he right of the owner of a parcel of land extends to the space above the
surface and to the resources below the surface," § 905 BGB. American property lawyers
will recognize this norm as the counterpart to the common-law maxim usque ad coelum et ad
infernos (up to the sky and down to the depths). The Constitutional Court never ques-
tioned that this is correct as a matter of private law, but it concluded that the constitutional
meaning of property is not determined solely by the private-law meaning, but is deter-
mined by the constitution itself. BVerfGE 58 at 335.
132 Id. at 329 ("So wie seine Befugnisse an den Grundstiicksgrenzen enden, endet seine Rechtss-
tellung in der Tiefe prinzipiell dort, wo er mit dem Grundwasser in Berzlhrung kommt." ['just as
one's authority over one's land ends at its borders, one's legal rights below one's land end
where the subsurface comes into contact with groundwater."]).
133 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
134 See BVerfGE 58 at 333.
135 See BVerfGE 58 at 332.
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Why has it historically been constitutional to assign property rights in
land to the private realm and rights in water to the public realm?
The Court gave more extended consideration to the functional
role of water in society. As part of its reasoning that the Water Law
falls within the "contents and limits" (Inhalt und Schranken) of owner-
ship of land, a matter over which the legislature has complete regula-
tory authority, 136 the Court emphasized that social changes occurring
in this century have necessitated certain adjustments in the legal regu-
lation of water. 137 Water has always been a vital resource to society,
the Court pointed out, but it has become even more so in modern
German society.138 As the Court observed, the processes of growing
industrialization, urbanization, and construction have increased the
scarcity and social importance of water. The Court declared that
water is one of the most important bases of all of human, animal,
and plant life. [Today] it is used not only for drinking and personal
use, but also as a factor of industrial production. Because of these
simultaneous yet diverse demands, it was previously established as a
matter of constitutional law that an orderly water management
scheme was vital for the population as well as for the overall
economy.139
At this point, one wants to say, yes, water is essential to life, but so
are many other resources. Would the Court be prepared to hold that
the Basic Law does not recognize private property rights in all other
natural resources that are necessary for life? Indeed, what about land,
which clearly also is essential to the existence of animals and plants?
Are we to surmise that private ownership of land is somehow being
put in jeopardy? That hardly seems likely. The point is that it begs
the question simply to declare that because certain resources are es-
sential to human existence, the constitutional status of property rights
in those resources must somehow be different from property rights in
other resources.
There are, however, important differences between water and
land. The most obvious respect in which subterranean water differs
from land, of course, is water's "fugitive," or ambient character.
136 This statement requires an important caveat: Under Article 14(1), the legislature
has sole competence to define the "contents and limits" of ownership, see GRUNDGESETZ
[GG] art. 14(1) (F.R.G.), but Article 19(2) requires that the Constitutional Court define
the essence of the constitutionally protected property right, GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19(2)
(F.R.G.) ("in no case may the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon.").
137 See BVerfGE 58 at 340.
138 For a penetrating analysis of the modern regulation of water in German and Aus-
trian law, see FRANZ MERLI, OFFENTLICHE NUTZUNGSRECI-ITE UND GEMEINGEBRAUCH 140-75
(1995). For a recent discussion of the dominant role that materialist rhetoric has played in
American discussions about natural resources, see Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality
of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 19-23, 45-49 (2000).
139 BVerfGE 58 at 341 (citing BverfGE 10, 89 (113) (1959)).
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Whereas land is necessarily immobile, underground water is not. The
Constitutional Court alluded to this factor when discussing the func-
tional significance of water. The Court emphasized that, as a human
resource, water is now vital both for purposes of drinking and indus-
try, and the increase in these social uses has brought the two more
and more in conflict with each other.1 40 This is especially true in the
case of groundwater, the Court noted.141 In that context, there is an
inevitable conflict between commercial uses such as excavation of sub-
surface resources and the community interest in protecting both the
supply and quality of subterranean water.142 The constitutional status
of water must be determined by taking into account the need to rec-
oncile these conflicting social interests.' 43 The Court concluded that
the first priority must be to preserve the quality of drinking water;
industrial uses of groundwater, such as the discharge of chemicals into
it, simply cannot be left to the discretion of each owner of land par-
cels. 144 Why? Why not rely on the market, predicated on private
property rights, to achieve an efficient allocation of groundwater?
Although the Court's answer here was a bit murky, its reasoning
echoes points that some American property scholars have made con-
cerning the limits of the market as a means of allocating rights in
groundwater. These scholars have pointed out that, left as a com-
mons, groundwater involves major problems with externalities, or spil-
lover effects. 145 Self-interest is not a reliable means of protecting a
resource whose use, especially given the resource's fugitive character,
has substantial external effects. As Eric Freyfogle has stated, "In the
case of water, . . . many external harms affect ecosystems and future
generations, or are otherwise uncertain in scope and infeasible to cal-
culate or trace.' 46 Flowing water, Freyfogle points out, is "com-
munally embedded," both in a social and an ecological sense. 147 The
ecological community includes "soils, plants, animals, microorga-
nisms, nutrient flows, and hydrological cycles.' 1 48 These two commu-
nities are themselves so interdependent that a threat to one is a threat
140 See supra text accompanying note 139.
141 See BVerfGE 58 at 340.
142 See id. at 343.
143 See id. at 341.
144 See id. at 340.
145 See the excellent discussion in Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The
Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249-53 (2000). For similar discus-
sions, see generally Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371 (1992) (discussing market failure in the environmental area);
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992) (examining harm to third parties when water rights are transferred).
146 Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 31 (1996).




to the other. 149 Under these circumstances, any individual use of
water profoundly affects the entire community and directly implicates
the common weal.
As the Constitutional Court stated, the major legal question is
whether shifting water regulation from the private to the public realm
can be constitutionally justified. 150 The argument was made that indi-
vidual rights in groundwater are'constitutionally inseparable from
ownership of the surface. 1 5 1 Rejecting this argument, the Court stated
that federal regulation of groundwater use would not effectively
empty landownership of all its content (Substanzentleerung des
Grundeigentums).152 Landownership would not become completely
subordinated to the social obligation.' 5  Merely subjecting the
owner's right to use groundwater to regulatory approval does not re-
move the entire use-interest from the bundle of rights.1 54 Even if it
did, the Court reasoned, there would be no constitutional violation
because the right to use groundwater is not a twig that is essential to
private ownership of the land. 155 The Court stated that ownership of
land is valuable primarily with respect to use of the surface, not subter-
ranean water. 156 Even with respect to the surface, the Constitution
permits regulation of various uses: "The constitutionally guaranteed
right to property does not permit the owner to make use of just that
use having the greatest economic value."'15
7
The Court's second basis for the constitutional validity of the Fed-
eral Water Law did not involve the constitutional property right itself,
but instead drew from the principle of equality. Article 3 of the Con-
stitution secures a principle of equality (das Gleichbehandlungsgebot),
which the Court has repeatedly stated informs the meaning of other
constitutional values, including property. 5 8 The plaintiff had argued
that the Federal Water Law arbitrarily burdened him, thus violating
his Article 3 equality right, because his quarry was located close to
groundwater while other quarry owners were not affected. 159 The
Court had little difficulty dismissing that objection, pointing out that
149 See generally Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's
Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927 (2000) (discussing ecological interdependence and its
implications on property law).
150 See BVerfGE 58, 300 (301) (1981).
151 See id. at 345.





157 Id. ("Aus der verfassungsrechtlichen Garantie des Grundeigentums ldfit sich nicht ein An-
spruch auf Einrdumung gerade deqenigen Nutzungsm6glichkeit herleiten, die dem Eigentiimer den
gr6lftmdglichen wirtschaftlichen Vorteil verspricht.").
158 See CURRIE, supra note 21, at 322-37.
159 See id. at 346.
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the regulation affected all similarly situated quarry owners equally. 160
Similarly, the regulation did not violate the constitutional principle of
proportionality (Verhdltnismfligkeit), because no particular owner was
singled out to bear a disproportionate share of the burden necessary
to achieve the benefits sought by the statute. 161
The final significant aspect of the case concerns the recurrent
problem of legal transitions. The Federal Water Law denied the
plaintiff a legal right that he once had and had previously exercised;
he had been quarrying gravel since 1936, and under the law existing
at that time, the right of property clearly protected the right to use
groundwater. 162 The Court directly confronted the familiar dilemma:
stability versus dynamism. On the side of stability, the Court stated,
It would be incompatible with the content of the Constitution
if the government were authorized suddenly and without any transi-
tional period to block the continued exercise of property rights that
had required substantial capital investment. Such a law ... would
upset confidence in the stability of the legal order, without which
responsible structuring and planning of life would be impossible in
the area of property ownership. 163
The Court was equally frank about the need to avoid freezing the
distribution of property rights extant at any given time:
The constitutional guarantee of ownership exercised by the
plaintiff does not imply that a property interest, once recognized,
would have to be preserved in perpetuity or that it could be taken
away only by way of expropriation [i.e., with compensation]. [This
Court] has repeatedly ruled that the legislature is not faced with the
alternative of either preserving old legal positions or taking them
away in exchange for compensation every time an area of law is to
be regulated anew. 164
The Constitution resolves this dilemma, the Court said, by per-
mitting the legislature to "restructure individual legal positions by is-
suing an appropriate and reasonable transition rule whenever the
public interest merits precedence over some justified expectation,
based on continuity of practice, in the continuance of a vested
right."165 The statute followed this constitutionally sanctioned path by
providing a grace period of five years, during which owners could con-
tinue to use groundwater without a permit.166 Because the Act did
not take effect until thirty-one months after its enactment, the claim-
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 348.
163 See id. at 349-50.
164 Id. at 350-51.
165 Id. at 351.
166 See id. at 352.
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ant effectively had almost eight years of continued use.167 Moreover,
owners could get an extension if they had filed for a permit.168 The
consequence of these provisions in the instant case, the Court noted,
was that the plaintiff had been able to continue his gravel operations
for some seventeen years after the statute's enactment. 169 Under
these circumstances, the statute's transition provisions reasonably ac-
commodated the plaintiff's economic interest.170
German constitutional scholars have debated whether the
"Groundwater Cases" made obsolete the concept of a regulatory tak-
ing (enteignungsgleicherEingrzff or equivalent expropriation). In Amer-
ican terms, the question is whether there remains an inverse
condemnation action available to property owners. It is understanda-
ble why some scholars believe that there is not. The Court did, after
all, permit the legislature to wipe away, without compensation, a dis-
crete property right that had once been expressly recognized. How
could there be any circumstance, then, in which the legislative obliter-
ation of a legally recognized property interest would trigger the obli-
gation to compensate? How could there be any circumstance in
which the legislature has "gone too far"?
One distinguished German scholar has argued that the case,
properly read, does not abolish the idea of compensation for regula-
tory takings. 17 1 He points out that the Constitutional Court never
mentioned the doctrine of regulatory takings anywhere in its opin-
ion. 172More significantly, subsequent developments in the case reveal
that the possibility of compensation for a regulatory taking is far from
dead. Following the Constitutional Court's decision, the case went
back to the Supreme Court. That Supreme Court awarded the plain-
tiff compensation.1 73 It did so on the theory that, although the basic
principle of property protection emerges from constitutional princi-
ples, the particulars of protection must be determined based on non-
constitutional law (einfaches Recht) . 174 The relevant nonconstitutional
basis for state liability in the case, said the Court, is the principle of
individual sacrifice (Aufopferungsgedanke) . 1 7 5 If governmental action




170 See id. at 351.
171 FRITZ OSSENBOIIL, STAATSHlAFTUNGSRECIIT 182-84 (4th ed. 1991).
172 See id. at 183.
173 See 20 NEUEJuRISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIIr [New Law Journal] 1169 (1984).
174 See id. at 1169-72.
175 See id. at 1171.
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is liable to compensate the individual in an action that is similar to,
but not technically, an "expropriation," as used in Article 14(3).176
This debate has continued without any clear resolution, leaving
this aspect of German state liability law (Staatshaftungsrecht) in consid-
erable confusion. Whatever its legal basis, the Supreme Civil Court's
decision does seem to leave open the possibility of monetary compen-
sation for regulatory takings. More interestingly, it creates the possi-
bility of compensation without a taking in cases in which justice seems
to demand it even though the Constitution does not.'
77
Three final comparative points about the "Groundwater Cases"
need to be made. First, the case makes clear that the German Consti-
tutional Court, like its American counterpart,17 8 has rejected what in
American takings literature has become known as "conceptual sever-
ance." Conceptual severance, a term first coined by Margaret Jane
Radin, means that every incident of ownership, every twig in the bun-
dle of rights, is itself ownership. 179 The implication of conceptual sev-
erance, of course, would be to strengthen vastly the bite of the
Takings Clause, because virtually every regulation affecting private
ownership of any resource would become a taking of ownership itself.
The U.S. Supreme Court's reaction to conceptual severance has been
somewhat ambiguous, 8 0 but the German Court clearly rejected it, at
least with respect to the relationship between land and subsurface re-
sources.'18  In fact, none of the Court's decisions under its constitu-
tional property clause provides any basis at all for supposing that the
Court is prepared to entertain such an approach.
176 What really seems to be going on here is a tug-of-war game between the Constitu-
tional Court and the Supreme Civil Court, with the latter taking a more expansive view of
the state's obligation to compensate private owners for governmental encroachment of
their property interests. In American terms, the conflict is somewhat analogous to the
difference between the views of Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Penn
Centralcase. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Ossenbuihl
has expressed the interesting idea that the alternative, nonconstitutional basis for compen-
sation in cases of regulatory takings should be customary law. That is, the concept of en-
teigungsgleicherEingsiffshould be separated from Article 14 of the Grundgesetz and treated as
a matter of customary law. See OSSENBOHL, supra note 171, at 185-87.
177 The possibility of this approach in American takings law is insightfully discussed in
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1009-13 (1999).
178 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
179 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988).
180 Although the Court in cases like Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, and, most re-
cently, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002), has expressly rejected conceptual severance, the analysis in other cases, like Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), appears to rely on conceptual severance.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
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The second point concerns the Court's statement in the
"Groundwater Cases" that the constitutional right to property does
not guarantee the right to exploit the resource for its highest eco-
nomic value.182 This statement indicates that German constitutional
protection of property is not rooted either in notions of wealth max-
imization or libertarianism. Eliminating those two possible theoretical
bases of constitutional protection of property has important implica-
tions for determining how a wide variety of contemporary American
takings disputes would be resolved under German law. Wetlands reg-
ulation is an obvious example. Landowners (especially farmers)
whose parcels include regulated wetlands have been very vocal in re-
cent years about their supposed constitutional right to capture the full
potential market value of the affected land. Using the Takings Clause,
they have challenged wetlands regulations precisely on the ground
that they deprive the owner of the ability to put the land to its highest
economic use. Whether or not German courts might find another
basis for striking down wetlands regulations, they clearly would reject
the basic premise of the attack on American wetlands regulations.
The third respect in which American property lawyers can learn
from the "Groundwater Cases" concerns the approach that the Ger-
man Court took to determine that the property interest in question
was what Carol Rose has called "inherently public property."' 83 The
Court focused on both the social necessity of the resource and the
degree of social interdependence associated with the resource and the
conditions of contemporary society.' 8 4 What the Court implicitly said
was the following: Any use of flowing water by any single person or
group of persons affects both the social and ecological communities
in multiple ways, and it is unrealistic to suppose that any given owner
will take into account all of these external effects. Indeed, precisely
because of the intensity of the social and ecological interdependence
that characterizes flowing water, no owner can possibly take into ac-
count all or even most of the external effects of a given use when
choosing among possible uses.' 8 5 The consequences of any given use
by an individual are both wildly unpredictable and profoundly felt by
the entire community. Under such circumstances of intense interde-
pendency, the boundary between meum and tuum is both meaningless
182 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
183 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 136-56.
185 See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351
(1996); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's
Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 379-83 (1998).
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and dangerously misleading. 18 6 A resource whose use so profoundly
affects the interdependent social and natural communities is inher-
ently public and can only be regulated by public norms as expressions
of the common will. Under this view, the German Federal Water Law
at issue in the "Groundwater Cases" is not redistributive. It does not
take an asset from A and give it to B. Rather, the statute is premised
on the understanding that groundwater, for constitutional purposes at
least, is now and always has been both A's and B's. It is not the state's
property, but property that is "inherently public."18 7
B. The Substantive Meaning of Property in German
Constitutional Law: Welfare Benefits
The Basic Law may be formally neutral regarding a positive duty
to create any particular economic system, but the Constitutional
Court certainly does not read the Basic Law as neutral with respect to
the core purpose of property in the overall constitutional scheme.
The Court has repeatedly stressed an interpretation that views prop-
erty as important only insofar as the interest involved implicates some
other substantive value that the Court regards as foundational in the
Basic Law's overall value hierarchy. The substantive values that the
Court has consistently linked with constitutionally protected property
interests are what I will call "individual self-realization" and "civic ca-
pacity." No line of decisions better illustrates the relationship be-
tween these fundamental constitutional values and the constitutional
protection of property than cases dealing with the status of welfare
benefits as constitutional property.
In a 1985 case, the Court considered whether an amendment to
the federal statute providing health insurance benefits for the elderly
violated Article 14.188 The Court held that it did not. 89 For present
purposes, the case is more important for what the Court said than for
what it held. The Court emphasized at the outset the legislature's
duty to protect the liberty of its citizens. 190 The claimants had as-
serted that, by reducing their health-care benefits, the legislature had
deprived them of a property interest that was essential to the personal
liberty that the social-state principle guaranteed.' 91 The initial ques-
186 See generally Butler, supra note 149 (discussing the "pathological effects" of property
norms on natural resources).
187 For a rich discussion of the legal status of water rights from a similar perspective,
see Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L.
REV. 257 (1990);Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENV'rL. L. 473
(1989).
188 See BVerfGE 69, 272 (Personal Contribution, 1985).
189 See id.
190 See id. at 284.
191 See id. at 280-83.
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tion was whether such welfare benefits (Eigenleistungen) counted as
property under Article 14.192
In general, German constitutional law, unlike American constitu-
tional law, does recognize as property what Charles Reich called "the
New Property."' 193 It does so, however, only under certain conditions.
A key prerequisite is that the beneficiary must have acquired the right,
at least in part, as a result of her own personal and "nontrivial" contri-
butions. 194 This prerequisite is the so-called "Eigenleistune' require-
ment. The requirement may be met not only by premiums paid
directly by the beneficiary herself, but also by premiums paid on her
behalf by third parties, including her employer. 195 There is no abso-
lute level or amount of-personal contributions required. The Court
stated, "For premiums[, like those in the instant case] that are pro-
duced throughout the year at varying levels because of changing legis-
lation, a complete examination will be required for fixing the degree
of the personal contribution.196
The Eigenleistung requirement effectively excludes from constitu-
tional protection those public-law entitlements that are based solely
on the state's duty to provide welfare maintenance. Examples include
housing subsidies' 97 and family allowances.' 98  However, unemploy-
ment insurance' 9 9 and pension plans2° ° satisfy the requirement.
As these examples illustrate, although German constitutional law
does extend substantive protection to some forms of state-originating
benefits, it by no means embraces all of Charles Reich's theory of the
"new property." What Reich called for in his famous 1964 Yale Law
Journal article was full constitutional protection for all forms of what
he termed government "largesse." 201 This concept included every-
thing from welfare benefits to federal Social Security to taxicab medal-
lions.2 2  Reich drew no distinction between those forms of
government-provided wealth to which the recipient had personally
contributed and those that were purely state payments intended for
the recipient's personal subsistence or the subsistence of members of
the recipient's family, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren. 203 German constitutional law, like its American counterpart,
192 See id. at 302.
193 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964).
194 See BVerfGE 69 at 300.
195 See id. at 302.
196 Id.
197 See BVerfGE 78, 232 (243-44) (1988).
198 See BVerfGE 39, 169 (170) (1975).
199 See BVerfGE 72, 9 (9) (1986).
200 See BVerfGE 53, 257 (257) (1980).
201 See Reich, supra note 193, at 785-86.
202 See id. at 734-37.
203 See id. at 778-79.
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clearly excludes the latter from substantive protection. 20 4 The per-
sonal-contribution requirement is not satisfied simply because the
claimant has paid taxes, which indirectly fund the program in ques-
tion. 20 5 The contributions must have been made directly to the pro-
gram itself.2°6 To hold otherwise would effectively eviscerate the
requirement, for few claimants will have paid nothing to the state
through taxes or other contributions to the public fisc.
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the treat-
ment of public-benefit interests under German and American consti-
tutional property law. Although both largely agree on the meaning of
"property" in this context, the cases discussed above demonstrate that
German law extends substantive, not merely procedural, protection to
those interests that are protected. American constitutional law limits
protection of state-derived interests to the procedural requirement of
notice and a hearing. 20 7 No American case has come remotely close
to suggesting that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies to
such interests. German constitutional protection, although limited
with respect to the scope of publicly derived interests that are covered,
is, by contrast, substantive. If no compensation is paid for the termi-
nation of a protected interest, the court will strike down the statute as
violating Article 14. In this respect, at least, German constitutional
law comes closer to embracing Reich's "new property" theory than
American law does.
Given that German constitutional law's protection of property is
broader and deeper than the protection provided by American consti-
tutional law in the ways just described, one can understand why some
commentators have concluded that property is a more highly valued
interest under the German Constitution than under its American
counterpart.20 8 That conclusion is premature, however, because
under German law, there is a second and more fundamental require-
ment for constitutional protection of public-law interests as property:
Even if the claimant has paid financial contributions to the benefit
program in question, the benefits will not be constitutionally pro-
tected against state encroachments or restrictions if the purpose of
the benefit program is something other than advancing the personal
autonomy of all participants in the program through assuring their
economic security. In the "Eigenleistung Case," for example, the Court
stated, "The feature that constitutes the basis for protecting as prop-
erty a legal entitlement to social security is that it should serve the
204 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
205 See BVerfGE 69, 272 (301) (1985).
206 See id. at 301-03.
207 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
208 See, e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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subsistence-level security of the person entitled." 20 9 The Court pro-
vided the following rule of thumb for determining whether this sec-
ond requirement is met: "Legal protection for social insurance
interests is possible only in the event that their termination or reduc-
tion would vitally affect the freedom-assurance function of the consti-
tutional guarantee of ownership. "2 0 The Court noted that many
entitlement claims in social insurance law clearly do not involve any
consequences for the claimant's personal subsistence. 2 1 Claims of
that sort do not merit the constitutional guarantee of property owner-
ship. 212 At the same time, though, it is not necessary that the claimant
be destitute or poor.213 Protected pensioners include white-collar em-
ployees (Angesteilten) as much as they do blue-collar workers (Ar-
beiter).21 4 The court expressly observed that in German society "the
great majority of citizens ... expect their subsistence-level security to
come" more from employment-based programs than they do from
their own personal resources.2 15
Although this line of thinking obviously does reflect the strong
influence of Germany's status as a social welfare state (explicitly recog-
nized in its Basic Law), it is not some version of communist nonsense.
Although the state and its benefits play a large role in Germany, so too
does private property. The German economy is, it bears remember-
ing, predominately a market economy. The Court's point in the
"Eigenleistung Case" is that the core constitutional function of property
is providing the material security that is necessary for both human
dignity and civic self-governance. In the German scheme, that func-
tion is served by both individually owned wealth and public benefits
that are entitlements by virtue of one's own contributions through
work.
The requirement that public benefits be connected to one's own
employment-based contributions in order to qualify as constitutional
property removes any basis for characterizing the German system as
illiberal or collectivist. At the same time, it must be said that the Ger-
man scheme of constitution property clearly does repudiate classical
economic liberalism. It is difficult to imagine reconciling the German
Basic Law with Richard Epstein's minimalist state21 6 or Robert
Nozick's night-watchman state. 217 Nor is German constitutional prop-
209 BVerfGE 69 at 303.
210 Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 303.
214 See id. at 303-04.
215 Id. at 303.
216 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
217 See NOZICK, supra note 27, at 26-28.
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erty law premised strictly on welfarism. The purpose of the personal-
subsistence requirement is not to promote welfare for its own sake but
as a means toward securing individual autonomy. Material well-being
is viewed as essential to, but not identical with personal autonomy.
Within the German scheme of constitutional property, autonomy, in
its full sense, means the capacity for self-realization. 218 No one lacking
in basic material needs for subsistence can experience self-realization,
but wealth alone is no guarantor of a fully realized self.
Synthesizing these two lines of constitutional property cases from
the German Constitutional Court, what emerges is a purposive con-
ception of property that differs in important respects from the view
implicit in most of the recent calls for greater constitutional protec-
tion of property in the United States. American takings cases, espe-
cially recent Supreme Court cases like Lucas,219 tend to protect
property because of its wealth-creating role.2 2 0 That is, the takings
cases reflect an understanding that the core, though not the only, pur-
pose of property as a constitutional value is individual-preference satis-
faction, a role that I have elsewhere labeled "property as
commodity. "221
The German approach is different. The core role of property in
the constellation of German constitutional values is to facilitate indi-
vidual self-realization, not only for its own sake, but also in the interest
of enabling citizens to be fully functioning and contributing members
of society. The cases in which the German Court has strongly pro-
tected property against regulatory encroachment are those in which
the involved interest primarily served a personal or social function
rather than an economic, wealth-creating function. 222 It is only when
the courts perceive that the interest immediately involved in the case
primarily serves this function that they, in effect, protect property as a
fundamental right. It is this purposive difference between the concep-
tions of property as a constitutional value that explains why property is
treated as fundamental under the German Basic Law, but not under
the American constitution.
218 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
219 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
220 Andrs v. Allard might seem to contradict this statement. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). It
held that a federal statute prohibiting the sale of eagle parts and artifacts made from such
parts was not a taking. See id. at 67-68. I do not think so, however. First, the case concerns
only personal property. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court went out of its way to
point out that the statute left intact other wealth-creating uses for artifacts made from
eagle parts. See id. at 66. If anything, then, I think that case supports, rather than under-
mines, the statement in the text.
221 See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 1.




NORMATrVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE
Having explained why property is given greater weight under the
German constitutional scheme than under its American counterpart,
the question becomes: What normative lessons should American law-
yers draw from the German experience? This Part addresses, albeit
briefly, two normative questions about constitutional protection of
property that have engendered considerable debate in recent years.
The first question, discussed in subpart A, is aimed at lawyers and
policymakers involved in constitution-making and constitution revi-
sion around the world, as well as at American lawyers: Are constitu-
tional property clauses inherently anti-redistributive? The second
question, examined in subpart B, concerns American constitutional
lawyers more directly: Should property be treated in our system as a
fundamental right for constitutional purposes, protected as fully as
are the rights to vote, free speech, and similar civil rights?
A. Are Constitutional Property Clauses Inherently
Anti-Redistributive?
Some North American constitutional scholars on the political
Left have argued that nations developing new constitutions or revising
existing ones should reject provisions expressly protecting private
property.223 The basis for this argument is the premise that constitu-
tional property clauses are inherently anti-redistributive.2 24 As such,
property clauses inhibit constitutional democracies from realizing
what these scholars consider politically and morally attractive visions
of distributive justice through the processes of deliberative politics.
Jennifer Nedelsky succinctly captures this view in the following
statement:
To designate property as a constitutional right conveys the idea of
property as essentially a private right requiring insulation from pub-
lic interference and control. In short, constitutionalizing property
is an extremely powerful symbol of the public/private divide which
designates governmental measures affecting property as public "in-
terferences" with a sacred private realm-which then bear the bur-
den of justification. 225
223 The clearest exponent of this view is Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitu-
tionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF
THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 422-32 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996). For a
similar view, see Frank I. Michelman, Socio-Political Functions of Constitutional Protection for
Private Property Holdings (in Liberal Thought), in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY, supra, at 433, 441-45. For a rebuttal of this view, see A.J. VAN DER WALT, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 1-29 (1997).
224 See Michelman, supra note 223, at 448-49; Nedelsky, supra note 223, at 422-23.
225 Nedelsky, supra note 223, at 422.
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Progressives rely on the experience of constitutionalized property
in the United States to support this view that the ,effect of constitu-
tional property clauses is inherently antithetical to government redis-
tributions of wealth.226 American property-rights advocates doubtless
would respond that this is nonsense, because property is a weakly pro-
tected right in our constitutional scheme, an interest that has had lit-
tle if any effect on the expanding state and its redistributive ways. The
whole thrust of their movement is to change that situation.
Looking at the experience of a nation with a constitution that
includes a property clause provides a more neutral perspective from
which to evaluate the claim that such clauses are inherently anti-dis-
tributive. Does the German experience confirm the fears of American
legal progressives? The short answer is "no." Shutting down the ac-
tivist state is neither the purpose nor the effect of the German Consti-
tution's property clause. Given the Basic Law's express commitment
to a social-welfare state,227 this is hardly surprising. Protecting prop-
erty interests across the board would seriously undermine that com-
mitment, for all social-welfare legislation encroaches upon private
property interests in some fashion.
Similarly, aggressive protection of all landed property interests of
every variety and in every context would substantially interfere with
the state's ability to promote community well-being in vital areas like
the environment, an area on which Article 14's "social obligation"
component weighs heavily. As the "Groundwater Cases" make abun-
dantly clear, environmental well-being is an area in which the individ-
ual land owner's social obligation is especially important.228 Rolling
back environmental regulations that restrict an owner's use of his land
or decrease its value in the interest of preventing coerced redistribu-
tion of wealth is fundamentally at odds with the German Constitu-
tion's theory of the relationship between private property and social
obligations.229
226 See, e.g., id. at 431 ("It is not appropriate to take the centrally contested questions of
distributive justice, of the allocation of power, of the inevitable trade-offs entailed in policy
areas such as environmental protection and insulate them from democratic debate.").
227 See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
228 See discussion supra Part III.A.
229 By the same token, the normative theory underlying the German constitutional
property clause is that the clause should not be used affirmatively as a tool to promote
redistributions of wealth. Rather, the takings regime should be redistributively neutral in
both directions. Just as redistributive effects do not themselves trigger a determination
that a regulatioris unconstitutional, neither is the constitutional property clause used (nor
should it be used) affirmatively as "a major engine of [promoting] redistribution." See
McUsic, supra note 29, at 665.
This approach is somewhat at odds with the recent theory of Hanoch Dagan. See Da-
gan, supra note 87, at 778-92 (arguing that progressive distributive considerations can and
should influence takings doctrine).
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As we have already seen, German courts do not take such an in-
discriminate approach to protecting property under Article 14.230
They do not consider all property interests to be fungible or equally
important. The weight that German courts attach to any given inter-
est depends upon a variety of factors, 23 1 the most important of which
is how immediately and substantially the interest in question protects
the affected owner's human dignity interest.232 In its relationship to
property, human dignity does not mean preference satisfaction.
Rather, it means the capacity and opportunity of individuals to lead
lives that are self-governing and self-realizing. 233 "Liberty" comes
close to expressing the value that underlies property's fundamental
status in the German constitutional scheme, but it does not fully cap-
ture the core ontological idea of living a life of self-realization. 234 The
kind of freedom that property promotes is what Alan Ryan calls "prac-
tical freedom,"235-that is, the opportunity of "human beings [to]
show their creative and intelligent capacities." 236 Some forms of prop-
erty are more important than others in maintaining freedom in this
sense. An apartment as home weighs much more heavily on this scale
than does, say, a small vegetable garden. Although both are property,
the former is fundamental, while the latter is not.23 7 In theory, all
property interests are fundamental rights in a formal sense under the
German Basic Law, but in effect the courts distinguish among them
according to their relationship to the deeper value of self-realization.
This approach is, quite obviously, not what American proponents of
treating property as a fundamental constitutional right have in mind.
The clear implication of the German experience for the redistri-
bution question, then, is that the progressives' fears are unfounded.
Constitutional property clauses need not freeze the extant distribu-
tion of wealth. The distinguished South African legal scholar Andre
van der Walt has argued that a constitutional property clause that has
At the same time, the German constitutional property clause's social obligation provi-
sion closely tracks Dagan's views regarding the social responsibility considerations in tak-
ings law, at least as applied to land. Id. at 767-78. Dagan argues that because "land
ownership is a source of special responsibility toward the landowner's community," id. at
772, takings doctrine should develop in ways that "promot[e] the virtue of social responsi-
bility," id. at 744.
230 See discussion supra Parts II and lII.
231 See discussion supra Part III.
232 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
234 Jeremy Waldron has used a similar conception of individual libety to argue that
homelessness is incompatible with human freedom. SeeJeremy Waldron, Homelessness and
the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1991).
235 RYAN, supra note 71, at 118.
236 Id. at 120.
237 Compare BVerfGE 89, 1 (Renter's Rights Case, 1993), with BVerfGE 52, 1 (Small
Garden Plot Case, 1979).
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a dual normative commitment to individual liberty and social welfare
is "a 'thick' multi-dimensional instrument of constitutionalism, [one]
which has to be read, understood, interpreted and applied with due
regard for the tensions between the individual and society, between
the privileged and the underprivileged, between the haves and the
have-nots, between the powerful and powerless."2 38
Of course, this is not to say that property clauses have no effect
whatsoever on governmental attempts at redistribution. Clearly, they
do provide outer limits on how far governments can go with legislative
programs that, either intentionally or not, have redistributive effects.
But any national constitution whose private-law background recog-
nizes the legitimacy of private-property rights will to some extent in-
hibit governmental redistributions of privately owned resources. In
the context of such legal systems, constitutional property clauses oper-
ate only on the margin; they do not create the core commitment.
B. Should Property Be Treated as a Fundamental Constitutional
Right Under the American Constitution?
The second normative question that this comparative project
prompts is whether the German experience furnishes grounds for re-
thinking the status of property as a fundamental right under the
American Constitution. In answering this question we need first to
take stock of the current status of property as a constitutional value in
the American scheme.
In reality, in some respects property already is given highly defer-
ential treatment in our constitutional scheme. Although it remains
true that for due process purposes courts apply a much weaker test in
evaluating the validity of public acts that encroach on property inter-
ests than they do when looking at regulation of activities like speech,
procreation, and travel, 239 due process protection is only part of the
story. Virtually every constitutional lawyer and property specialist
knows that the constitutional property story has shifted from the Due
Process Clause to the Takings Clause.240 In the takings setting, prop-
erty rights have played a much larger role over the past two decades.
In its new role, property is hardly the "poor cousin" that many com-
mentators have depicted in the past. The renaissance of the Takings
Clause has given property far more robust constitutional value than it
238 VAN DER WALT, supra note 223, at 13.
239 Government acts that encroach upon fundamental rights must serve a compelling
state interest if they are to pass constitutional review. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Government acts that encroach upon property interests, on
the other hand, merely must substantially advance a legitimate state interest. See Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
240 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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had just twenty years ago. For example, the Nollan-Dolan nexus test 24'
and the First Evangelical Church temporary-takings doctrine 242 have
greatly expanded the extent to which constitutional law protects pri-
vately owned resources. Moreover, the scope of resources within the
protective reach of the Takings Clause has also expanded. Although
most of the modern takings cases have involved land,243 courts have
protected a variety of other forms of property as well.2 44
Still, it would be disingenuous to say that the so-called "takings
revolution" has achieved everything that property-rights advocates
seek. Their long-term agenda, presumably, is to finish the "Reagan
Revolution" by dismantling the regulatory state and ending most
forms of state redistribution of wealth. Had state and federal courts
implemented the plan detailed in Richard Epstein's notorious book,
Takings,245 that is exactly what the takings renaissance would have ac-
complished. But thus far, at least, no such luck. From the perspective
of property-rights advocates, the takings revival's biggest disappoint-
ment has been the fact that the Takings Clause has had minimal, if
any, effect on the most transparently redistributive government pro-
grams, including federal and state welfare programs and the progres-
sive income tax.24 6 No one believes that a takings attack on these
programs would have the slightest chance of success in the foresee-
able future. Even interests in land have occasionally been left unpro-
tected against government regulations whose redistributive effects are
difficult to gainsay. 247 In short, for all of the ballyhooed advances of a
pro-property interpretation of the Takings Clause, the degree of pro-
tection accorded to property interests is nowhere close to that granted
to fundamental rights like procreation, speech, and voting. The tak-
ings revolution, in short, has not been Lochner redivivus.
Would a comparative perspective change this? Should Germany's
experience with property as a fundamental constitutional right en-
courage American constitutional lawyers to rethink the extant Ameri-
241 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
242 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1987).
243 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
First Evangelical Church, 482 U.S. at 306.
244 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524' U.S. 498, 529-37 (1998) (finding an unconstitu-
tional taking in the application of a federal statute to a former coal mining company,
where the statute required the company to make substantial contributions to a health ben-
efits fund for retired mine workers); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160
(1998) (holding that interest earned on client funds deposited in Interest on Lawyers
Trust Accounts is clients' property for the purpose of analysis under the Takings Clause).
245 EPSTEIN, supra note 6.
246 The notable exception to this statement is the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel. See supra note 244.
247 See, e.g., Vee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992) (holding that a rent
control ordinance did not constitute a physical taking of property).
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can regime? After all, one might argue that Germany, a constitutional
democracy with a market-based economy much like ours, has suc-
ceeded in protecting property as a fundamental constitutional value
without eliminating all legislatively mandated redistributions of
wealth. Should not the United States, the most property-oriented so-
ciety in the world, follow suit and use the German Basic Law as a
model for changing our due process and takings doctrines? The short
answer, once again, is "no." Although there may be persuasive rea-
sons to treat property as a fundamental right under our Constitution,
the German example is not one of them. There are substantial differ-
ences between the background constitutional practices of the two sys-
tems, making the comparative argument a matter of apples and
oranges.
It is grossly misleading to say that property enjoys far greater re-
spect and protection under the German Basic Law than it does under
the U.S. Constitution. 248 Although German courts and commentators
do designate property as a "fundamental" constitutional value, that
characterization does not have the same meaning as it does in Ameri-
can constitutional jurisprudence. German constitutional doctrine
does not track the American distinction between substantive due pro-
cess protection of property and protection against uncompensated
takings. The German Constitutional Court cannot order compensa-
tion for unconstitutional expropriations; only the legislature can do
So. 2 4 9 The Court's remedy in such cases is limited to striking down the
offending legislation. 250
Similarly, there is no real analogue to the substantive due process
doctrine in the German scheme. Although German courts certainly
do provide substantive protection for property interests, they do so
only within the context of Article 14 of the Basic Law, either on the
ground that the statute or regulation in question is an uncompen-
sated expropriation of property or that the regulation imposes a con-
stitutionally unjustified limitation on the affected property interest.
The test is not, as it is for fundamental liberty interests under the sub-
stantive due process doctrine, whether the regulation substantially ad-
vances a compelling state interest.25' Applying that test to property
interests would go a long way toward fulfilling the property-rights ad-
vocates' dream of shutting down, or at least substantially inhibiting,
redistributive legislation, for much of it would fail this stringent test.
But, as we have seen, that is emphatically not the situation under the
German constitutional system.
248 See discussion supra Part 1II.
249 See DOLZER, supra note 90, at 16-18.
250 See id.
251 See supra note 15.
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The long and short of the situation is that the United States can-
not mimic the German experience. The differences between our
background constitutional doctrines are too great to permit trans-
planting Germany's constitutional property doctrine into our consti-
tutional scheme. Germany's round peg simply won't fit into our
square hole.
This is not at all to say, however, that the United States has noth-
ing to learn from the German approach. We can and should think
deeply about the wisdom of their purposive interpretation of constitu-
tional property. As we have already discussed, the German courts vary
the amount of protection granted to particular property interests de-
pending upon the main purpose that the affected interest serves. 252
Property interests are treated as fundamental interests to the extent
that they promote the core constitutional values of human dignity and
self-realization. 253 American constitutional property jurisprudence
lacks an explicit and fact-specific focus on the purposes that property
interests serve. The German purposive approach would force Ameri-
can courts to face openly the question of why some property interests
are more protected than others. Is property's primary constitutional
purpose to promote wealth creation, to serve some noneconomic
goal, such as personal privacy, 25 4 or is it to promote fairness through
the leveling of the playing field on which government regulators and
individual owners deal with each other?255 American courts, unlike
their German counterparts, simply do not openly address questions
like these. This lack of transparency regarding the core reasons for
granting constitutional protection to property has made American
constitutional property doctrine the mess that it is. In this respect, we
have much to learn from the Germans.
CONCLUSION
Two lessons emerge from this comparative project, the first spe-
cific, the second general. The specific lesson is that American courts
can and should emulate the German courts' practice of purposive
analysis of constitutional property claims. This practice involves a sim-
ple two-step process: First, the U.S. Supreme Court should clearly ar-
ticulate the core reasons behind the Constitution's property clause.
Second, American courts should analyze the property interest imme-
diately involved to determine whether and to what extent the interest
252 See discussion supra Part III.
253 See discussion supra Part III.B.
254 This is one way of understanding the per se rule adopted in Loretto. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
255 This is one interpretation of the Nollan-Dolan doctrine. See supra note 241 and ac-
companying text.
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implicates the core purpose of constitutional protection of property.
The more that a core constitutional purpose is involved, the more a
court should protect the interest, either under the Takings Clause or
through the substantive due process doctrine. The likely result of this
approach would be to maintain current constitutional practice in
some categories of cases, while changing those practices in other
cases. If the affected interest strongly implicates the constitutional
property clauses' core purposes, a more robust substantive due pro-
cess doctrine may be needed; in other cases the doctrine should re-
main moribund. Similarly, the renaissance of the Takings Clause may
continue, even advance in some types of cases, while in others the
Takings Clause should play a less active role than it currently does.
Specifically where doctrinal changes will occur would depend on how
the courts define the core reasons for constitutionalizing property
rights in the first place. The process of identifying those reasons
would, of course, be enormously controversial. Although the question
of what those reasons are would remain subject to controversy, the
German experience provides grounds for believing that a consensual
understanding would develop over time.
The second, more general lesson to be learned from comparing
German and American approaches to constitutional protection of
property is that constitutions cannot be morphed. Critics of current
American constitutional practice who cite Germany's treatment of
property as a "fundamental" constitutional value 256 ignore this point.
They naively assume that constitutions are liquid and easily morphed
and can readily migrate from one state to another. Such critics would
have us use the German constitution as the model for changing our
constitutional practices regarding property by designating property as
a "fundamental" right, d la the Germans. 25 7 But constitutions, while
malleable, are not liquid. Background political traditions, institu-
tional arrangements, and doctrinal practices limit the extent to which
one nation can shape its constitution's interpretation in the image of
another nation's comparable provision. Constitutional borrowings do
occur, of course. For example, much of the new South African consti-
tution, including its property clause, was borrowed from the German
Basic Law, but South Africa's private-law tradition of Roman-Dutch
law may give different meanings to those provisions than the mean-
ings their German ancestors carry.258 South Africa is not Germany,
however. Its Constitution, no matter how textually similar or identical
to Germany's, cannot recreate the German Basic Law. Constitutional
256 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 21, at 290-99.
257 See, e.g., id.
258 See van 'der Walt, A Critical Analysis of the Civil-Law Tradition in South African Property
Law, 11 S.AJ. ON HUMAN RTS. 169 (1995).
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morphing will occur in the course of attempts to borrow, but the
morphing will not be intentional. It will instead result from indige-
nous legal conditions.
This inability of constitution makers and interpreters to morph
constitutions at will does not mean that the enterprise of comparative
constitutional law is pointless. As this Article has already empha-
sized,259 American constitutionalists have much to learn from the Ger-
man experience with constitutional protection of property. Although
we cannot replicate the German experience, we can learn from Ger-
many's interpretive practices, most notably from its purposive ap-
proach to weighting particular property interests. The point of the
comparative enterprise is not to find models to mimic, but to remove
our interpretive blinders and enhance our expressive transparency.
We cannot morph other constitutions, but we can still learn from
them.
259 See discussion supra Part IV.
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